doned (and thus unloved) in the back streets
of some third world megapolis. Would I, as a
loving pet owner, be faced with a real rroral
dilemna like the one proposed by Nelson
wherein "the claims of impartial reason and
the claims of partial affection are both
!!Orally respectable"?
Could I justifiably
decide in favor of my chimp and choose to use
the human solely as a means to my chimp's
end?

A COMMENTARY ON NELSON'S

"XENOGRAFT AND
PARTIAL AFFECTIONS"
WILLIAM AIKEN
Chatham College

By developing his argument fran "partial
affection," Nelson has attempted to justify
xenograft without having to "impartially"
defend species partiality.
It is an inter
esting tack, but I am afraid that it is not
all that useful in settling tile moral contro
versy over xenograft.
I will show this by
setting up a parallel case of partial affec
tion involving xenograft, show how it meets
rrost of Nelson I s considerations justifying
partiality, and then raise the question whe
ther he would accept my case or if, in re
jecting it, he must return to sane species
partiality argument.

The considerations which Nelson raises
seem to apply in my case as well.
I am not
granting any claim of species partiality but
am basing my partiality on personal affec
tion.
I need not endorse the questionable
practice for obtaining the organ (the black
market dealer) in order to accept the justi
justi
fiability of my private decision. The funda
mental interest at stake and the lack of
alternatives for his/her child and my chimp
are similar.
Refusal to buy the kidney is
not certain to save the child from death, but
buying it will save my chimp.
I could work
for econanic and social reform in that third
world nation or for sane control of exploi
tive
ti
ve organ trading and thus I could still
show my respect for impartial considerations
and my respect for "subjects of a life" that
are human.
And finally, because the "donor"
in this case was not a marginal human, he/she
is exempt fran Nelson I s "tragedy of marginal
cases" argument.
Our cases seem similar in
all relevant respects. Affection alone seems
to tip the scales in justifying the personal
decision.
Nelson

can do one of three things with
First, he can see it as a reductio
and withdraw his claim that partial affection
alone can justify xenograft involving killing
when species impartiality is assumed.
Se
cond, he can accept the implication of my
case and affirm that sanet.imes we may justi
fiably use as a mere means an unloved human
to preserve a loved non-human. Since species
is irrelevant and since killing in one case
is permissible, killing in the other case is
permissible provided that the one saved is
loved and the one sacrificed is not.
Third,
and I suspect he would choose this option, he
could try to show how my case is relevantly
my case.

My case just reverses the donor and the
donee.
The ailing patient is my pet chimp
with whom I have a strong personal bond of
love; a love worthy of admiration and which
has rroral value, for our "histories are in
tertwined in significant ways."
This love
and its consequent value are not universal
izeable and my partiality is neither "ex
treme" nor "unquestioned. " Nor does this
love prevent my respecting other sources of
value.
My chimp needs a kidney to continue
living.
suppose that no chimp kidneys are
available, that xenograft techniques have
been perfected, and that no hum:m kidneys are
available through conventional sources.
But
I could purchase one fran a black-market
dealer who kills and then sells the body
parts of extremely impoverished but otherwise
nonnal children whom he/she has found aban

BElWEEN THE

SPECIES

DISCUSSION
DISCUSSION�
126

M'

cies should take precedence in conflict situ
ations.
I f so, then we seem to be back to
the issue between Frey et. al. on whether
species partiality can indeed be "i.mp:rrt.ial
ly" justified on grounds of comparative roc>ral
worth.
Partial affections do not, it seems,
play ~
~ role in this crucial and I
think
pivotal question of comparative roc>ral worth
unless you beg the question by asserting that
because all and only hlUllans are in loving
relationships they autanatically have superi
or roc>ral worth.
In fact, the argument from
partial affections doesn't add much at all to
the xenograft debate other than perhaps to
explain parental nntives if xenograft is
roc>rally permissible, and to tnitigate roc>ral
blameworthiness if it is not.
So, I am not
convinced that this interesting tack via
partial affections is at all helpful in de
ciding whether xenograft is right or wrong.

different from his.
He could do this by
evoking the one consideration on his list
which I did not transfer over into my case,
that "it is at least plausible that death is
a greater harm to the child than to the
baboon.
The child's death may foreclose a
greater range of satisfaction and preclude
So, he
projects of greater rooral worth. "
could argue that his case is different from
mine because it is plausible that a child's
death is a greater harm than a baboon's
death, whereas it is not plausible that my
chimp's death is a greater harm than the
death of the abandoned child.
Thus, his
sacrificing the baboon is not beyond roc>ral
limits, but my sacrificing tl1e child is,
because of the comparative worth of the
beings in question.

ANIMALS.
ANIMALS.�
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I f he took this stance, we could inter
pret him in two different ways.
Either he
would mean that a particular child (Baby Fae)
compares favorably to a particular baboon
(Goobers) or generally any hlUllan compares
favorably to any non-hlUllan.
Ccrnparing par
ticular individuals leaves open the possibil
ity that some non-hlUllan would be judged to be
of greater roc>ral worth than sane hlUllan and
thus if greater rooral worth is a relevant
consideration in sacrificing a non-hlUllan for
a hlUllan, then it would also be relevant in
sacrificing a human for a non-hlUllan.
My
chimp may indeed have greater roc>ral worth
than sane hlUllan who is not "marginal" ( for
instance, a vicious and violent psychopath).
So, sanetimes my chimp should win.
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However, I imagine that Nelson would
want to endorse the general claim that it is
plausible that the hlUllan species is superior
in roc>ral worth and thus members of this spe-
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